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In response to Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 537 (2007), and Trevor W. Morrison, Complete Preemption and 
the Separation of Powers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 186 (2007), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/issues/articles/155-3/Morrison.pdf. 
 
Recent pieces by Professors Gil Seinfeld
1
 and Trevor Morrison
2
 
criticize the Supreme Court’s complete preemption doctrine as mis-
guided and unconstitutional, respectively.
3
  Professor Seinfeld suggests 
reforming the doctrine around field preemption,
4
 and Professor Mor-
rison rejects complete preemption as inconsistent with separation of 
powers.
5
  This response defends the Supreme Court’s doctrine as it 
currently stands:  A state law claim arises under federal law (and so 
may be removed to federal court) when a federal statute both pre-
empts the claim and supplies an exclusive federal remedy.
6
  This doc-
trine is a sensible application of the well-pleaded complaint rule that 
prevents improper circumvention of federal question jurisdiction. 
My disagreement with Professors Seinfeld and Morrison stems 
from their characterization of the complete preemption doctrine.  
Both argue that the doctrine creates an exception to the well-pleaded 
 
 
†
 Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law.  I owe a debt of 
gratitude to my colleague Keith Beyler and my former colleague Rocky Rhodes for tak-
ing time to review and offer invaluable comments on a prior draft.  All errors that re-
main are intended as a test of the reader’s knowledge. 
1
Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (2007). 
2
Trevor W. Morrison, Complete Preemption and the Separation of Powers, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 186 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/issues/articles/ 
155-3/Morrison.pdf. 
3
The following discussion assumes familiarity with the main arguments in Profes-
sors Seinfeld and Morrison’s pieces, as well as the background of the complete pre-
emption doctrine. 
4
See Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 574-79 (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s com-
plete preemption jurisprudence could be clarified by linking the availability of federal 
defense removal to the “breadth of the preemptive statute relied upon by the defen-
dant”). 
5
See Morrison, supra note 2, at 193-94 (contending that Congress, not the courts, 
should determine the extent to which federal law preempts state law). 
6
See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (describing complete 
preemption as a circumstance in which a state claim can be removed to federal court). 
148 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 137 
PENNumbra 
complaint rule that allows courts to consider federal law defenses in 
deciding federal question jurisdiction.
7
  Conversely, defenders of the 
doctrine have called it (properly, I believe) a “corollary” to the well-
pleaded complaint rule that simply recharacterizes preempted state 
law claims according to their true federal nature.
8
  While the differ-
ence between exception and corollary may seem semantic, it goes to 
the heart of the Seinfeld and Morrison arguments.  For Professor 
Seinfeld, the distinction exposes an unexplained gap in the Court’s 
logic:  Why make an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule for 
the defense of complete preemption but not for other federal law de-
fenses?
9
  For Professor Morrison, the judicially created exception vio-
lates separation of powers:  Congress, not the federal courts, is author-
ized to expand federal court jurisdiction.
10
 
This response counters by asking a question that neither Professor 
Seinfeld nor Professor Morrison addresses:  What does it mean for a 
complaint to be “well-pleaded”?  I argue that a well-pleaded complaint 
is one that a reasonable lawyer would draft under the circumstances.  
Professors Seinfeld and Morrison look at only part of this picture—
what a reasonable lawyer would leave out of the complaint, such as an-
ticipated defenses—and ignore the mirror image case, what a reason-
able lawyer would include in a complaint, such as an exclusive federal 
cause of action.
11
  Seen from this vantage point, the complete preemp-
tion doctrine and the bar on pleading anticipated defenses are simply 
 
7
To see the similarities between the two, compare Morrison, supra note 2, at 193-
94, and Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 538-39. 
8
See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, 
Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (No. 02-306), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/3mer/1ami/2002-0306.mer.ami.pdf (“This 
Court has also recognized, as a corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, that a 
plaintiff may not defeat federal jurisdiction by the simple expedient of omitting to 
plead necessary federal questions.”). 
9
Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 539. 
10
Morrison, supra note 2, at 193-94. 
11
During oral argument in Beneficial National Bank, a Justice hinted at this reading 
of well-pleaded: 
The problem with it is your complaint isn’t well-pleaded if the only source of 
law is Federal, which you conceded on your brief and again here.  There is no 
well-pleaded Alabama claim because the Alabama claim or the State law claim 
doesn’t exist.  The only claim that exists against a national bank for usury is a 
Federal claim. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. 1 (No. 02-306); see 
also id. at 35-36 (“[T]here’s a difference between preemption as a defense to a claim 
that is well pleaded and here where you have badly pleaded a complaint that can arise 
only under Federal law that simply can’t arise under State law.”). 
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two sides of the well-pleaded complaint coin. 
Conceived this way, the complete preemption doctrine has two 
main advantages.  In Part I, I argue that the doctrine creates symmetry 
within the well-pleaded complaint rule.  The bar on pleading antici-
pated defenses prevents plaintiffs from improperly forcing cases into 
federal court, while the complete preemption doctrine prevents plain-
tiffs from improperly keeping cases out of federal court.  In Part II, I 
argue that this approach is consistent with the early application of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule.  The complete preemption doctrine, 
then, is hardly a recent innovation that impermissibly expands federal 
question jurisdiction in violation of the separation of powers. 
I. PLEADING FOR ERROR:  THE STATE COURT PLAINTIFF’S ARTFUL 
DODGE 
Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,
12
 in which the Court clarified 
the complete preemption doctrine, illustrates how a plaintiff can use 
artful pleading to stay out of federal court.  The plaintiffs were taxpay-
ers who alleged that a tax preparation company had misled them re-
garding tax refund advances and that a national bank had then 
charged them excessive interest on those advances.
13
  The plaintiffs’ 
complaint named five state law claims:  fraud, suppression of material 
facts, breach of fiduciary duty, common law usury, and statutory 
usury.
14
  The defendants removed the case to federal court on the 
ground that the two usury claims were completely preempted by the 
National Bank Act,
15
 and the federal district court then denied the 
plaintiffs’ subsequent motion to remand.
16
 
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, plaintiffs’ counsel 
conceded that the National Bank Act preempted the plaintiffs’ usury 
claims.
17
  This is not surprising given that a long line of Supreme 
 
12
539 U.S. 1 (2003). 
13
Id. at 4. 
14
Complaint at 7-12, Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., No. CV-2000-088 (Cir. Ct. Ala. 
Sept. 19, 2000). 
15
Notice of Removal at 3-5, Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 948 
(M.D. Ala. 2000) (Civ. Act. No. 00-C-1457-N); see 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 (2000) (mandat-
ing the federal rates of interest on loans, discounts, and purchases; and defining usuri-
ous interest and penalties for taking such interest). 
16
Anderson, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 952, rev’d, 287 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub 
nom. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003). 
17
The following exchange took place between the Court and plaintiffs’ counsel: 
QUESTION:  Is it the case that this Federal cause of action is intended by 
Congress as the exclusive vehicle excluding your State cause of action under 
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution? 
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Court cases had so held,
18
 and that the plaintiffs did not urge overrul-
ing those cases.
19
  So the question arises:  Why file a complaint that al-
leges claims that any reasonable lawyer would know are preempted?
20
  
This is an especially curious question because omitting the usury 
claims would have made it clear the case was not removable.
21
  Given 
that pleading the usury claims and then defending them against dis-
missal would be costly, the plaintiffs’ lawyers must have seen some 
value in asserting those claims.  While counsel never explained why 
they asserted the usury claims, the following inferences are reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
First, the plaintiffs’ lawyers wanted to be in state court.  The plain-
tiffs’ complaint lists only state law claims,
22
 and while the parties were 
completely diverse,
23
 each plaintiff alleged $74,900 in damages.
24
 
Second, as noted above, a reasonable lawyer would know that the 
state usury claims were preempted by federal law, and that the only 
valid usury claim was under the National Bank Act.
25
  An unbroken 
 
MR. CLARK:  Under Supremacy Clause— 
QUESTION:  Is the answer to my question yes or no? 
MR. CLARK:  That is—yes, that is what those cases hold. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 33-34. 
18
See Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 10-11 (describing the Court’s “longstanding 
and consistent construction of the National Bank Act as providing an exclusive federal 
cause of action for usury against national banks”). 
19
See generally Brief for Respondents, Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. 1 (No. 02-306). 
20
Plaintiffs’ counsel was asked a very similar question at oral argument and of-
fered the following evasive response:  “Well, and—plaintiffs have different reasons for 
pleading the things they do.  Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, of course, it’s 
their prerogative to rise and fall on the causes of action that they choose to plead.”  
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 46-47. 
21
See id. at 19-21 (acknowledging that the plaintiffs’ non-usury state law claims, 
standing alone, would not have been removable). 
22
See Complaint, supra note 14, at 7-12 (asserting state law claims for intentional 
misrepresentation, suppression of material facts, breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory 
and common law usury). 
23
Id. at 2-5 (asserting that the defendants were all “foreign corporations,” and the 
plaintiffs were all citizens of Alabama). 
24
Id. at 6 (“Each Plaintiff individually seeks judgment against Defendants joint 
and severally for compensatory damages and punitive damages not to exceed $74,900 
per named Plaintiff.”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (“The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum 
or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of differ-
ent States . . . .”). 
25
12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86 (2000).  I leave aside the question of how complete preemp-
tion applies when the plaintiff’s pleadings would not state a claim under the exclusive 
federal law; however, Justice Antonin Scalia did raise the question during oral argu-
ment in Beneficial National Bank.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 6-8.  
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line of Supreme Court cases had reached this conclusion,
26
 and plain-
tiffs’ counsel conceded the point at oral argument. 
Third, a violation of the state usury laws would have been easier to 
prove than the plaintiffs’ other claims.  The usury claims relied on a 
straightforward review of objective evidence:  Did the loan documents 
reveal interest charges in excess of the legal rate?
27
  The plaintiffs’ re-
maining claims, however, all required difficult factual or legal deter-
minations.  The fraud claims entailed proof of the defendants’ intent, 
the materiality of the misrepresentation (if any), and the plaintiffs’ re-
liance on the misrepresentation.  The suppression of material facts 
claim required a showing of a “confidential relationship” as well as the 
materiality of the misrepresentation.  And the breach of fiduciary duty 
claims required proof of a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiffs 
and defendants. 
Fourth, plaintiffs consistently argued that the decision whether to 
dismiss the usury claims as preempted must be left to the state trial 
court judge.
28
 
Fifth, the only way for the plaintiffs to benefit from their state 
usury claims would be for the state trial court to incorrectly conclude 
that those claims were not preempted. 
The preceding inferences and observations leave one conclusion:  
the plaintiffs alleged state usury claims with the strategic hope that the 
state trial court would incorrectly fail to dismiss those claims, either by 
 
To understand the issue, consider a case where state law imposes strict liability, but that 
law is preempted by a federal law that requires a showing of intentional wrongdoing.  
Assume that the plaintiff fails to allege intent, relying on the strict liability standard of 
state law.  In that case, the state law claim is preempted, but the plaintiff’s allegations 
would not support a federal claim.  See id.  Because Beneficial National Bank did not pre-
sent such a case, the Court did not address this question. 
 While this response does not develop the point, I note that the approach proposed 
above would ask whether the reasonably competent lawyer could have pleaded such a 
claim.  If the plaintiff’s allegations are ambiguous, meaning that there is no indication 
whether there was intent, the case should be removable on the ground that it prevents 
circumvention of federal jurisdiction.  Otherwise, the artful plaintiff could avoid com-
plete preemption by making vague allegations that meet state law but not federal law.  
Further, this would give the plaintiff whose claim would not satisfy the federal law stan-
dard reason to make that clear in her state court pleading. 
26
See Evans v. Nat’l Bank of Savannah, 251 U.S. 108, 114 (1919); Haseltine v. Cent. 
Bank of Springfield, 183 U.S. 132, 134 (1901); Barnet v. Nat’l Bank, 98 U.S. 555, 557-58 
(1878); Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 32-34 (1875). 
27
See Ala. Code § 8-8-1 (1975) (mandating maximum rates of interest on loans). 
28
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 38 (“[T]he fact that it may be 
ordinary—ordinarily preempted is something that—that the defendants can raise and 
the State courts can decide.  And the State courts have often—often decided matters of 
Federal preemption.”). 
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mistake or because of an anti-federal (or local) bias.  The circum-
stances surrounding the state court lawsuit perhaps encouraged that 
hope.  To start, Alabama elects its judges,
29
 creating an incentive for 
judges to favor donors and local voters.
30
  The preemption issue in 
Beneficial National Bank played into that incentive—the presiding state 
judge would know that by interpreting federal law in a certain (incor-
rect) way, he could provide a benefit to all twenty-six plaintiffs, each of 
whom resided in the county where the judge stood for election.
31
  Tak-
ing the defendants’ view, the decision to remove was easy—success of 
the plaintiffs’ strongest claim depended on judicial error or bias, and 
the apparent incentives were aligned toward that result. 
The above analysis highlights a difference in emphasis from Pro-
fessor Seinfeld’s article.  His analysis and proposed reform focus 
mainly on the federal interest in uniform interpretation and applica-
tion of federal law.  However, as Professor Morrison notes, the com-
plete preemption doctrine does not track this federal interest very 
well, because the importance of uniformity in any single case is unre-
lated to whether federal law provides an exclusive federal remedy.  
Rather, the federal interest in uniformity is related to a host of other 
factors, many of which are historically contingent.
32
 
This response shifts the focus to the plaintiff’s behavior.  Com-
plete preemption poses the curious situation of a plaintiff who pleads 
a claim that is doomed on the merits.  The plaintiff so pleads because 
the preempted state law claim is more favorable than the plaintiff’s 
remaining claims; his strategy, in essence, is to hope that the state 
court will err in deciding the preemption question.  When a plaintiff 
behaves this way, federal courts necessarily have an interest in hearing 
the case—both to avoid the desired legal error and to discourage 
other plaintiffs from pursuing the same strategy.  And while this inter-
 
29
See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 152 (amended 1973) (“All judges shall be elected by 
vote of the electors within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts.”). 
30
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“Elected judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied 
with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.”). 
31
See Complaint, supra note 14, at 2-4.  State campaign finance disclosure docu-
ments indicate that the judge to whom the Beneficial National Bank case was first as-
signed reported receiving over $225,000 in campaign contributions the year before the 
litigation was filed.  See L. Bernard, Smithart, Ala. Fair Campaign Practices Act, Candi-
date or Elected Official Annual Report (Form 1A) (Jan. 29, 1999), available at 
http://arc-sos.state.al.us/CGI/SOSELc12.mbr/output?P01=001599619990131C. 
32
See Morrison, supra note 2, at 190-93 (elaborating on other factors that color 
federal interests). 
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est arguably applies to both complete preemption and ordinary pre-
emption, federal question jurisdiction should be limited to the former 
because, as discussed next, only complete preemption is consistent 
with a proper understanding of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
33
 
II. RECONSTRUCTING THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT 
Both Professor Seinfeld’s article and Professor Morrison’s re-
sponse apply the well-pleaded complaint rule without explaining pre-
cisely what makes a complaint “well-pleaded.”  A well-pleaded com-
plaint ought to be viewed as the complaint that a reasonable lawyer 
would have drafted.  This standard has three related applications rele-
vant to the current discussion.  First, the well-pleaded complaint in-
cludes only those allegations required to state a claim under the rele-
vant pleading rules.  Because pleading rules do not require the 
plaintiff to anticipate defenses,
34
 such matters are not within a well-
pleaded complaint.  Second, a reasonable lawyer may decide which 
meritorious claims to include in the plaintiff’s complaint.  For exam-
ple, a lawyer may strategically omit meritorious federal claims, and rely 
exclusively on state law claims, in order to prevent removal from state 
court.  And third, the legal characterization of the plaintiff’s allega-
tions should be that which a reasonable lawyer would give to the facts 
alleged.  Just as a frivolous assertion of a federal claim does not sup-
port federal question jurisdiction, so too a federal claim disguised in 
state-law clothing does not defeat federal jurisdiction.  Because I read 
Professors Seinfeld and Morrison to agree with the first two proposi-
tions, I focus on the third. 
While the well-pleaded complaint rule is most closely associated 
with the case Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley,
35
 the earlier 
case Boston & Montana Consolidated Copper & Silver Mining Co. v. Mon-
tana Ore Purchasing Co.
36
 is most instructive for present purposes.  In 
 
33
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that implicit in the creation of a fed-
eral cause of action is the recognition that federal question jurisdiction is critical to the 
vindication of the federal interest underlying the federal statute.  See Merrell Dow 
Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 (1986) (“The significance of the necessary 
assumption that there is no federal private cause of action thus cannot be overstated. 
For the ultimate import of such a conclusion, as we have repeatedly emphasized, is that 
it would flout congressional intent to provide a private federal remedy for the violation 
of the federal statute.”). 
34
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring mainly “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). 
35
211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
36
188 U.S. 632 (1903). 
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Montana Ore, the plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendants from mining 
ore from the plaintiff’s property without permission.  The Court 
treated these allegations as asserting a state law claim for conversion.  
The plaintiff’s pleading further alleged that the defendants would 
likely justify their mining as legal under federal law.  The plaintiff re-
lied in part on the anticipated federal defense to support federal ju-
risdiction.
37
 
In rejecting federal jurisdiction, Montana Ore linked the well-
pleaded complaint rule to competent pleading under the rules of 
procedure: 
It is quite plain that the various averments contained in the complain-
ant’s bill for the purpose of showing jurisdiction in the Circuit Court are 
wholly unnecessary in order to make out complainant’s cause of action 
for the conversion of ore . . . .  To make out a prima facie case on the part 
of complainant, so far as its right to the ore in question is concerned, all 
that was necessary was to show the patent and the complainant’s posses-
sion under it . . . .  It would be wholly unnecessary and improper in order 
to prove complainant’s cause of action to go into any matters of defence 
which the defendants might possibly set up, and then attempt to reply to 
such defence, and thus, if possible, to show that a Federal question might 
or probably would arise in the course of the trial of the case.  To allege 
such defence and then make an answer to it before the defendant has 
the opportunity to itself plead or prove its own defence is inconsistent with 
any known rule of pleading so far as we are aware, and is improper.
38
 
Montana Ore, then, linked the well-pleaded complaint rule to the 
pleading that the reasonably competent lawyer would file. 
Montana Ore also discussed how to analyze the plaintiff’s legal 
characterization of his claims.  The plaintiff had argued that his alle-
gations were best read as asserting a claim to quiet title—by mining on 
the plaintiff’s land, the defendants effectively denied the plaintiff’s 
ownership.  On this view, the case raised the validity and scope of the 
United States land patent under which the plaintiff held title.  In re-
jecting this argument, the Court looked beyond the plaintiff’s charac-
terization of his claim to decide whether the alleged facts truly as-
serted a quiet title action.  The Court found that no such claim existed 
because the plaintiff had failed to make necessary allegations,
39
 and 
held that the complaint was best read as stating only a state law claim 
 
37
Id. at 634-35. 
38
Id. at 638-39 (emphasis added). 
39
Specifically, the Court found that the plaintiff had failed to allege either that a 
court had previously decided title in his favor, or that he was in possession of the prop-
erty.  Id. at 641-42. 
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for conversion: 
[I]t is plain that the suit is not in truth a suit to quiet title.  There is a cause 
of action alleged that is not founded upon any such theory, to prove 
which it is not necessary or proper to go into the defendants’ title or to 
anticipate their defence to the cause of action alleged by the complain-
ant.
40
 
Since the only valid claim rested on state law, the case could not be 
brought in federal court.
41
 
Montana Ore shows that the plaintiff’s legal characterization of her 
allegations does not define the well-pleaded complaint.  Rather, the 
well-pleaded complaint is read to assert the claims a reasonable lawyer 
would conclude are within the allegations.  So, in Montana Ore, the 
complaint is read to include the valid conversion claim but not the in-
valid quiet title claim.  This prevented the plaintiff from asserting fed-
eral question jurisdiction, because a reasonably competent lawyer 
would not draft a complaint alleging invalid claims.  Similarly, in Bene-
ficial National Bank, the complaint was read to include the valid Na-
tional Bank Act claim but not the preempted state usury claims.  In 
both cases, the plaintiffs were precluded from manipulating federal 
jurisdiction through artful pleading that served no valid purpose.  In-
deed, the jurisdictional argument in each case succeeds only if a court 
makes an inadvertent or intentional error.  The well-pleaded com-
plaint rule should be read to discourage claims whose success depends 
on such judicial errors. 
One might argue, as did Justice Scalia in Beneficial National Bank, 
that the well-pleaded complaint should be read to state no claim 
rather than an exclusive federal claim.
42
  But this approach abandons 
the reasonable lawyer view of the well-pleaded complaint.  In addition 
to assuming competence, we ought to assume the reasonable lawyer 
behaves ethically, pursuing only legitimate strategies.
43
  To read the 
plaintiff’s complaint as only stating a preempted state law claim that 
must be dismissed imputes an illicit motive to our reasonable lawyer—
pleading a frivolous claim in the strategic hope of judicial error.  In-
stead, we ought to read the complaint as drafted by a reasonable law-
 
40
Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
41
Id. at 642. 
42
See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 20 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“Federal jurisdiction is ordinarily determined . . . on the basis of what claim is 
pleaded, rather than on the basis of what claim can prevail.”). 
43
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2003) (“The advocate has a 
duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause, but also a duty 
not to abuse legal procedure.”). 
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yer “who truly seeks recovery”
44
—i.e., a lawyer with a proper motive.  
This is done by reading the plaintiff’s own allegations to state the exclu-
sive federal claim, which is precisely what the complete preemption 
version of the well-pleaded complaint rule does. 
CONCLUSION 
The above defense of the complete preemption doctrine is 
straightforward.  When federal law provides an exclusive remedy, the 
only reason to allege a preempted state law claim is the hope that a 
state court will err.  While the plaintiff is ordinarily the master of her 
complaint, the well-pleaded complaint rule should not encourage 
such hopes.  Because the Court’s current complete preemption doc-
trine eliminates that perverse incentive, and is consistent with earlier 
case law, it ought to be retained. 
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44
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra 
note 8, at 17-18 (“Absent removal, the state court would have only two legitimate op-
tions—to recharacterize the claim in federal-law terms or to dismiss the claim alto-
gether.  Any plaintiff who truly seeks recovery on that claim would prefer the first op-
tion, which would make the propriety of removal crystal clear.”). 
